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Abstract
Background: No two countries have adopted identical regulatory measures on cloning.
Understanding the complexity of these regulatory variations is essential. It highlights the challenges
associated with the regulation of a controversial and rapidly evolving area of science and sheds light
on a regulatory framework that can accommodate this reality.
Methods: Using the most reliable information available, we have performed a survey of the
regulatory position of thirty countries around the world regarding the creation and use of cloned
embryos (see Table 1). We have relied on original and translated legislation, as well as published
sources and personal communications. We have examined the regulation of both reproductive
cloning (RC) and non-reproductive cloning (NRC).
Results: While most of the countries studied have enacted national legislation, the absence of
legislation in seven of these countries should not be equated with the absence of regulation.
Senator Morin was not correct in stating that the majority of recent legislation bans both RC and
NRC. Recent regulatory moves are united only with regard to the banning of RC. While NRC is
not permitted in seventeen of the countries examined, it could be permitted in up to thirteen
countries.
Conclusions: There is little consensus on the various approaches to cloning laws and policies, and
the regulatory position in many countries remains uncertain.
Background
"The immense majority of countries who have passed leg-
islation recently do ban both reproductive and therapeu-
tic cloning" (Senator Morin, The Standing Senate Committee
On Social Affairs, Science And Technology, Ottawa, Canada,
Wednesday 18 February, 2004).
In February 1997 an article was published in Nature
announcing the birth of what was to become the most
famous sheep in history [1]. That sheep, known as Dolly,
was the product of asexual reproduction. As the world's
media unhesitatingly announced, she was a clone. The
prospect of a human clone led to immediate calls for reg-
ulatory controls on the technology. There were, however,
divisions, particularly when it became apparent that the
potential uses of the technique were not limited to repro-
duction. Other potential uses came one step closer when,
in the following year, it was announced that embryonic
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stem cells had been successfully extracted from non-
cloned human embryos [2]. Now, a year after the death of
Dolly [3], it is appropriate to review the current regulatory
position on the creation and use of cloned embryos
around the world [4,5] – particularly considering the pub-
lic debate that has surrounded the recent cloning experi-
ments in Korea, the granting of the first "research cloning"
license in the UK, and the past and impending UN clon-
ing debates.
This paper is concerned with the creation of functional
embryos, whether by nuclear transfer or embryo splitting.
As this suggests, we will use 'embryo' to refer to any
human entity considered theoretically capable of implan-
tation and development in the womb. Many regulatory
positions distinguish between the creation of a cloned
embryo for reproductive purposes and for other purposes.
For our purposes, the former will be called reproductive
cloning (RC for short) and the latter non-reproductive
cloning (NRC for short). This paper will examine the regu-
latory position of the thirty countries for which we have
been able to obtain reliable information (see Table 1).
Where possible, we have relied on copies of the original
legislation or of English translations of that legislation. In
some situations we have also found it necessary to rely on
other published sources [6] and personal
communications.
Understanding the complexity of this "regulatory patch
work" is essential [7]. It provides a sense of the vast differ-
ences between nations, the issues on which there are dif-
ferent views, and the existing regulatory uncertainties. In
addition, it highlights both the challenges associated with
the regulation of a controversial and rapidly evolving area
of science and the need for a regulatory framework that
can accommodate this reality. Finally, it demonstrates
Table 1: Summary of regulation*
Country National legislation and effect, or approach in the absence of national legislation
Australia Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002: Prohibits both RC and NRC
Austria Act No.275 of 1st July 1992: Implicitly prohibits both RC and NRC
Belgium Law of 11th May 2003: Prohibits RC but permits NRC
Canada Assisted Human Reproduction Act 2004: Prohibits both RC and NRC
China None Ministerial regulations prohibit RC and allow NRC
Denmark Law No.460 of 1997: Prohibits both RC and NRC
Finland Medical Research Act No.488 of 1999: Prohibits RC, but NRC might not be included within this prohibition
France Law of July 2004: Prohibits both RC and NRC
Germany Embryo Protection Act 1990: Prohibits both RC and NRC
Greece Law 3089 of 23rd December 2002: Prohibits RC, but does not cover NRC
Iceland Law No. 55 of 29th of May 1996: Prohibits both RC and NRC
India None Guidelines reject RC but might allow NRC
Ireland None Constitutional provision might prohibit both NRC and RC
Israel Prohibition of Genetic Intervention (Human Cloning and Genetic Manipulation of Reproductive Cells) Law 1999: Imposes a moratorium 
on RC, silent on NRC
Italy Law of 2003: Prohibits both RC and NRC
Korea Bioethics Law 2003: Prohibits RC, silent on NRC
Luxembourg None
Mexico General Health Law of 7 May 1997: Prohibits both RC and NRC
Netherlands Embryo Act 2002: Prohibits RC and imposes a moratorium on NRC
New Zealand Medicines (Restricted Biotechnical Procedures) Amendment Act 2002: Prohibits RC, silent on NRC
Norway Law No. 100 of 5 December 2003: Prohibits both RC and NRC
Peru General Law No. 26842 of 9 July 1997: Prohibits both RC and NRC
Portugal None Ratified Convention (discussed below)
Russia Law on the Temporary Prohibition of Human Cloning 2002: Imposes a Moratorium on RC
Spain Law 35 of November 1988: Prohibits both RC and NRC
Sweden Law No. 115 of 14th March 1991: Implicitly prohibits both RC and NRC (with possible gaps)
Switzerland Federal Law of 18 December 1998: Prohibits both RC and NRC
Thailand None
UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990: Permits NRC under licence Human Reproductive Cloning Act 2001: Prohibits RC
United States None Some states have legislation prohibiting RC or both RC and NRC
* The International Digest of Health Legislation http://www3.who.int provides translations of the legislation of Austria (1993, vol 44); Denmark 
(1997, vol 48); Israel (2000, vol 51), Norway (2003, vol 54), Peru (1998, vol 49), and Switzerland (1999, vol 50, and 2003, vol 54). The Bulletin of 
Medical Ethics provides translations of the legislation of Finland (Feb 2000, p7) and Germany (Dec 1990, p9). In addition, we have used English 
translations of the legislation of Greece http://www.coe.int, the Netherlands http://www.minvws.nl, and Sweden (Ministry of Health and Social 
Affairs, Swedish Act concerning Use of Gene Technology on Human Beings and Experiments with Fertilised Ova, 1991).
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that policy makers cannot rely on the existence of a single
regulatory trend to inform policy development. Only on
the banning of RC (reproductive cloning) do the world's
legislatures and policy-makers display anything approxi-
mating a single mind. Senator Morin, who is a member of
Canadian Senate, was not right to claim that a majority of
recent legislation bans both RC and NRC (non-reproduc-
tive cloning). Even looking beyond recent legislation,
only a narrow majority of the thirty countries studied
actually prohibit NRC. What is more, a large minority of
countries have yet to enact national legislation.
This paper is divided into sections. The next, section II,
will examine the degree of regulatory variation in the
countries studied. Section III will ask whether the exist-
ence of legislation answers all regulatory questions. Using
examples drawn from those countries with legislation, we
seek to show how broad interpretative strategies are some-
times required to avoid unintended lacunae. Section IV
uses examples to demonstrate the evolving nature of reg-
ulatory positions and increasing reliance on legislation.
Section V examines the impact of international initiatives
in European (ie the European Convention on Human
Rights and Biomedicine) and the United Nations. Section
VI will explain why the regulatory outcome usuallysays lit-
tle about the ethical approach adopted by a particular
jurisdiction. Section VII is the conclusion.
Variation between countries
As many commentators have noted, there is great varia-
tion in regulatory approaches even within countries that
have decided to create relevant laws and policies [4,5,7,8].
No two countries have adopted identical regulatory meas-
ures on cloning, though the effect of those adopted in
some countries is very similar. There is only one area of
regulatory agreement – no jurisdiction has, yet, adopted
legislation or guidelines permitting RC. As a result, there
are essentially only two regulatory approaches to RC: pro-
hibition or regulatory silence. Regulatory silence usually
means that RC is technically legal in the jurisdiction in
question, though if it were attempted, there would likely
be a rapid regulatory response.
The majority of the countries studied have now enacted
national legislation (see Table 1). Only seven have yet to
do so. The absence of national legislation in these seven
countries should not, however, be taken to amount to an
absence of regulation or, in the case of the US, an absence
of state legislation. Legislation is just one of many possi-
ble regulatory responses. Ireland provides an illustrative
example. The Eighth Amendment to the Irish Constitu-
tion (which forms Article 40.3.3) states that,
"The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn
and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the
mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as
practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right."
While this provision does not mention cloning, it has
been taken to protect in vitro embryos and thereby pro-
hibit NRC. In addition, doctors must comply with the
guidance of the Medical Council, as this body has the
power to remove their licence to practise in Ireland. The
Medical Council's guidelines declare that " [t]he creation
of new forms of life for experimental purposes or the
deliberate and intentional destruction of human life
already formed is professional misconduct" [9]. Also, it
limits the manipulation of sperm or eggs to the "improve-
ment of health" and adds that "if the intention is...the cre-
ation of embryos for experimental purposes, it would be
professional misconduct" [9]. Thus, the absence of legis-
lation in Ireland does not render all things permissible.
Variation and non-reproductive cloning (NRC)
NRC represents the source of considerable regulatory var-
iation. While NRC is not permitted in seventeen of the
countries studied, it could be permitted in up to thirteen
other countries. Regulatory uncertainties make it impossi-
ble to be sure in some of these counties. Also, some coun-
tries (such as the US) have many jurisdictions, each
capable of adopting a different regulatory position. Given
the superficial similarity of many of these countries and
jurisdictions, it is hard to explain such stark variation on
cultural differences alone [8,10].
Only Belgium and the UK have deliberately enacted or
extended legislation for the purpose of permitting the cre-
ation of cloned embryos for research [6,11]. The UK
licensing authority has, in fact, granted its first licence to
conduct NRC [12]. Similarly permissive approaches,
albeit non-legislative, have been adopted by China
(which issued Ministerial Regulations in August 2003 to
allow cloning research for therapeutic purposes) [6,13]
and Korea (where the government is in the process of
approving limited research on limited somatic nuclear
transfer research) [6].
In contrast, Finland, Greece, Israel, Russia and Sweden
appear to allow NRC only because their legislation has
potential gaps [14]. The Greece legislation is the most
striking, because it is the most recently enacted. The Greek
Law 3089/2002 explicitly prohibits 'human reproduction'
by any cloning method, but no mention is made of NRC.
This must have been deliberate, because the provision
allowing embryo research does so by allowing research
(with consent) on "fertilized ova" that are surplus follow-
ing assisted reproductive treatment. Indeed, the legisla-
tion's Explanatory Memorandum declares that
BMC Medical Ethics 2004, 5:9 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/5/9
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"only reproductive cloning is prohibited. It could be thus
construed that therapeutic cloning is permitted....This
position has also been supported in the Report of the
National Bioethics Committee regarding the use of stem
cells in biomedical research and clinical practice
(21.10.2001), submitted to the Prime Minister on
11.1.2002."
This is nonetheless controversial in Greece, which has rat-
ified both the European Convention on Human Rights
and Biomedicine, and its Additional Protocol on cloning
(discussed below).
The US, India, and Portugal are anomalous. In the US,
what little national legislation there is only concerns the
use of federal funds [4] and some States (such as Califor-
nia and New Jersey) have even adopted permissive legisla-
tion [15]. The Indian Council of Medical Research has
declared that "research on cloning with intent to produce
an identical human being, as of today, is prohibited", but
has not declared NRC to be so prohibited [16]. However,
an Indian Government policy document "opens the door
to therapeutic cloning considered on a case-by-case basis
by the National Bioethics Committee" [6]. Portugal has
no national legislation, but has ratified the European
Convention and its Additional Protocol (see below).
Legislative gaps and uncertainties
There are, of course, many nations that have long standing
laws that are relevant to cloning technologies. In many of
these nations, however, the laws were designed prior to
Dolly and the recent advances in stem cell research. As
such, how these laws might apply to cloning is sometimes
unclear. Also, these laws are not a result of a public and
political dialogue about the complex scientific and ethical
issues that are associated with cloning and stem cell tech-
nologies. [10] In addition, there are a number of countries
where recent legislative intervention has failed to answer
all legal questions relating to human cloning.
The legislation of some countries clearly encompasses
somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT). The Spanish Law 35
of November 1998 is an example of a pre-Dolly legisla-
tion of this type. This Act not only renders it an offence to
create identical human beings where it is aimed at race
selection, it also renders it an offence to create "human
beings by cloning in any of the variants or any other pro-
cedure capable of originating several identical human
beings." The Canadian Assisted Human Reproduction Act
2004 is an example of post-Dolly legislation of this type.
Under this Act, the creation and implantation of a
"human clone" are prohibited. "Human clone" is defined
under s. 3 to mean "an embryo that, as a result of the
manipulation of human reproductive material or an in
vitro embryo, contains a diploid set of chromosomes
obtained from a single – living or deceased – human
being, foetus or embryo". This clearly captures SCNT.
In a number of contrasting countries, SCNT is only cap-
tured by a broad, non-literal interpretation of the relevant
provisions. The Swedish Law No. 115 of 14 March 1991 is
an example of pre-Dolly legislation of this type. This Act
only regulates experiments performed on "fertilised ova"
or gametes "before fertilisation". The Finnish Medical
Research Act 1999 is a rare example of post-Dolly legisla-
tion of this type. This Act has many provisions with
respect to research on embryos (including a prohibition
on the creation of embryos for research) and it prohibits
all research conducted with the aim of cloning a human
being. However, s. 2 of the Act defines an embryo as "a liv-
ing group of cells resulting from fertilisation not
implanted in a woman's body". Thus, the Dolly technique
only appears to be covered insofar as its use involves
"research with the aim of cloning human beings" (Also,
s.1 of the Constitution secures the inviolability of human
dignity, but there is no authoritative interpretation on
whether (and how) this provision could apply to clon-
ing). If this aim is only correctly attributed to RC, then
NRC might not be covered at all.
The dangers of non-literal interpretation of pre-Dolly pro-
visions should not be exaggerated. Although there are a
number of countries that have such legislation (notably,
Austria and Germany and, until very recently, France) [5],
in reality the courts are likely to adopt a broad, purposive
approach to interpretation. A very broad approach was,
for example, taken when the domestic courts addressed
the UK's Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990
[17]. The Act explicitly prohibited only one form of clon-
ing (the creation of a clone by replacing the nucleus of an
embryo) leaving the licensing authority to regulate activi-
ties such as the creation, storage, and use of in vitro
embryos. More precisely, the Act imposes a licensing
requirement on the creation of an in vitro embryo
(ss.3(1)(a) and 1(2)); storage or use of in vitro embryos
(ss.3(1)(b) and 1(2)); storage of gametes (s.4(1)(a)); and
use of gametes, unless 'services are provided for the
woman and man together' (s.4(1)(b)). Yet, under s. 1(1)
of the Act, "embryo" is defined as "a live human embryo
where fertilisation is complete", including "an egg in the
process of fertilisation". This raised the question of
whether SCNT fell outside the Act altogether. Nonethe-
less, the House of Lords recently held that SCNT produces
a functional embryo that falls within the ambit of this Act
(in effect, holding that the Act's definition of embryo is
non-exhaustive and restricted in purpose) [18].
Evolving nature of the laws
Not only is there a great deal of variation between nations
and much uncertainty as to the scope of existing laws,
BMC Medical Ethics 2004, 5:9 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/5/9
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many of the existing laws and policies are in a state of flux.
Indeed, some countries have built in review provisions.
The Dutch legislation, the Embryo Act 2002, presents an
example. This Act prohibits procedures undertaken for the
purpose of creating genetically identical human individu-
als and prohibits the creation of embryos for research. Yet,
s. 33 of the Act allows for the future repeal of the prohibi-
tion on the creation of embryos for research. Likewise, the
recently enacted Canadian legislation states that a Parlia-
mentary review of the law is required within three years of
proclamation.
Some countries, such as Israel, New Zealand and Russia,
have even adopted time-limited legislation. The Israel leg-
islation of 1999, for example, states that, for a period of 5
years, no intervention will be carried out on human cells
for the purpose of human cloning or to bring about the
creation of a person by the use of reproductive cells that
have undergone permanent intentional genetic modifica-
tion [19]. What is more, the Act states that the Minister of
Health may (upon satisfaction of a number of conditions)
permit the creation of a human being through the use of
genetically modified cells. Non-legislative bans are often
time-limited or chosen because of the ease with which
they can be reconsidered.
Other countries are in the process of considering a revi-
sion to their existing law. Ireland has set up a Commission
on Assisted Human Reproduction in 2000 to explore this
topic [20] and the Irish government has officially stated its
opposition to cloning [21]. There are voices calling for
revision of the Germany legislation [22]. The recently
passed Italian legislation might have to be reconsidered
because a referendum on a disputed law can be forced if
500,000 signatures are obtained and it has been reported
that over a million people have signed a petition calling
for a referendum [23]. The Swedish legislation might well
be amended in the near future, to close the gaps men-
tioned in the last section. If the Government Bill 2003/
04:148 on stem cell research is enacted, it will come into
force on the 1st of January 2005. This Bill seeks to extend
the existing legislation to make it clear that RC using the
somatic nuclear transfer is encompassed and to explicitly
allow somatic nuclear transfer as a way of creating
embryos for non-reproductive purposes. Thus, Sweden is




The European Convention on Human Rights and Bio-
medicine has now been signed by 31 of the 45 member
States of the Council of Europe, of which 15 have also rat-
ified the Convention [24]. It has not been signed by any
of the non-member participants (which include Australia,
Canada, the Holy See, Mexico, and the US). While this
Convention does not specifically address human cloning,
a number of its provisions have implications for cloning.
Article 18(2) of the Convention prohibits the "creation of
human embryos for research purposes". The phrase
"human embryos" is not defined by the Convention and
subsequent negotiations of the working party on the pro-
tection of the human embryo and fetus appear to have
failed to reach agreement on this and other issues. This
provision only prohibits NRC if it captures the creation of
all functional human embryos for research. While the Con-
vention makes provision for referrals of questions of inter-
pretation to the European Court of Human Rights (Article
29), referral is unlikely because the Convention arguably
leaves such decisions to the discretion of individual States.
The Strasbourg court itself allows individual States a wide
discretion (known as the 'margin of appreciation') in con-
troversial policy areas. The court has, for example,
adopted this approach when considering whether the
fetus is included in the provision of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
that grants 'everyone' a right to life (see the latest case: Vo
v France (no. 53924/00)). Moreover, before signing or rat-
ifying the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedi-
cine, any State could make a reservation to this provision
insofar as it is inconsistent with their pre-existing law
(Article 36). This is what we would expect the UK to do if
it eventually signs the Convention.
Whether RC is implicitly prohibited by the Convention is
more controversial. Those who hold that cloning violates
human dignity will no doubt point to Article 1, which
requires parties to the Convention to "protect the dignity
and identity of all human beings". This seems tenuous.
There is, however, an Additional Protocol on the
Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings [25]. Article 1 of
the Additional Protocol declares that,
Any intervention seeking to create a human being geneti-
cally identical to another human being, whether living or
dead, is prohibited.
Since "genetically identical" is defined, under Article 1(2),
as "sharing with another the same nuclear gene set", use
of the Dolly technique on humans is included within this
prohibition. This provision clearly captures RC. What is
more controversial is whether it covers NRC. To foreclose
this possibility, when the Dutch government signed the
Protocol it added an interpretative statement declaring
that it "interprets the term "human beings" as referring
exclusively to a human individual, ie a human being who
has been born". This interpretative statement is arguably
unnecessary, because, in the absence of a definition of
BMC Medical Ethics 2004, 5:9 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/5/9
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human being in the Convention itself, States are free to
interpret this provision in accordance with their own
national policy.
The impact of these international instruments is particu-
larly important with regard to the three countries that
have ratified both: Portugal (which has no legislation),
Greece (whose legislation only explicitly prohibits RC),
and Spain (which has comprehensive legislation in this
area). In Greece, the Explanatory Memorandum to the leg-
islation declares that ' [i]t could be...that therapeutic clon-
ing is permitted exactly as in Article 1 paragraph 1 of the
Additional Protocol on Cloning'. We understand that con-
servative opinion is of the view that this interpretation is
in conflict with Article 18(2) of the Convention itself.
However, neither the Convention nor the Protocol on
Cloning provide any sanctions for violation.
ii) United Nations
The United Nations' struggle to agree on a cloning treaty
exemplifies both the variation of approaches and the chal-
lenges associated with seeking consensus in a morally
contested area [26]. In December 2001, the UN General
Assembly established an Ad Hoc Committee to consider
"the elaboration of an international convention against
the reproductive cloning of human beings" [27]. Since
that time, a number of treaty proposals have been consid-
ered. A proposal by France and Germany, for example,
recommended a narrow ban on RC only, leaving NRC for
future debate [28]. A second proposal supported by Spain
and the US, argued for a comprehensive ban on cloning,
including NRC [29]. The most recent proposal, which was
put forward by Costa Rica, would require states to estab-
lish criminal offences for all human cloning, including
NRC [30].
There has, however, been little consensus on how to pro-
ceed. Though all countries agree that RC should be
banned, there is deep division regarding NRC. Neither the
Ad Hoc cloning committee nor the UN's Legal Committee
could reach a consensus on which proposal to support
and bring before the General Assembly. In November
2003 the Legal Committee voted (80-79) to recommend
a two-year deferral on a General Assembly decision – a
compromise that was put forward and supported by most
of the members of the Organization of the Islamic Confer-
ence. This decision was largely seen as a victory for those
countries supporting a more permissive approach to clon-
ing policy [31]. Indeed, some viewed the two year delay as
an ideal opportunity for the scientific community to pro-
mote the value of NRC [32]. However, in response to pres-
sure from those countries seeking a comprehensive ban,
the General Assembly came to yet another compromise.
In January 2004 the General Assembly overturned the
Legal Committee's recommendation and supported a one
year delay on the debate over the cloning treaty. This
October, the General Assembly re-opened the debate,
again with no apparent compromise from either camp
[33].
The fact that the deep division at the UN is primarily
about NRC reflects the lack of any consistent approach to
cloning policy. For example, one would expect an emerg-
ing trend toward the banning of NRC, as suggested in the
quote by Senator Morin, to be reflected in the building of
consensus or, at least, a degree of flexibility at the UN
General Assembly.
Ethical considerations
Few areas of regulation are as evidentially driven by ethi-
cal views as the regulation of cloning and cloning
research. This is not the place for in-depth analysis of the
underlying debate. Elsewhere we have both argued that
existing regulatory attempts to prohibit RC have rarely
been underpinned by thoughtful exposition of underlying
ethical principles [5,10,34]. Policy statements frequently
rely on claims that are tautologous, under specified,
poorly considered, or a combination of these things. Our
claim here is more modest. In this section we seek to show
why attempts to understand the ethical basis of the exist-
ing law cannot focus solely on the existing regulatory out-
comes. And, of course, the regulatory outcome does not,
necessarily, represent a jurisdictional consensus on the
central ethical issues.
Lawyers rarely look to regulatory outcome to understand
ethical debates. Unfortunately, in the area of cloning
many commentators do that very thing. As our starting
quotation demonstrates, politicians and commentators
are all too ready to find support for their ethical views in
regulatory positions adopted elsewhere. There are,
however, varying levels of ethical agreement. Agreement
on the appropriate regulatory position does not imply
agreement on the underlying ethical principles.
Consider the relationship between ethical positions on
the moral status (or dignity) of the cloned embryo and
NRC. The cloned embryo could be considered to have
full, no, or limited moral status [18,35]. The full status
position would grant the embryo the same level of moral
duties as you or I. The no status position would grant the
embryo no more status or dignity than your hair or nails.
The limited status position would grant the embryo a fixed
or gradualist level of intrinsic moral value between these
two extremes. The full status position will require the pro-
hibition of NRC (destructive use of embryos is considered
murder) and the no status position will usually require
NRC to be permitted (unless such an approach will inter-
fere with the moral interests of those who do matter). The
limited status position is, however, potentially compati-
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ble with either regulatory position, depending on the par-
ticular status given to the early embryo and the weight
given to potential benefits of NRC. It follows that the fact
that the regulatory position permits or prohibits NRC
does not do even tell us what status the embryo is consid-
ered to have. This is further complicated by the fact that
supporters of the no or limited status position might be
prepared to accept more restrictions than are strictly
required by their position to protect a more important
moral goal. Only supporters of the full status position
cannot coherently make such pragmatic compromises
[18].
Similarly, the existing positions on RC could be supported
by radically different ethical views. Prohibitions could be
supported by those who hold that RC is absolutely wrong
(eg always violates human dignity) and by those who
hold that cloning at present would be wrong. Even time-
limited prohibition does not enable us to discern whether
it is underpinned by, for example, the view that RC is
wrong because of current safety issues or the view that RC
is not wrong but the most effective way to get there is by
initially prohibiting it.
In sum, the majority of regulatory outcomes could be
coherently explained by reference to one or more under-
lying ethical positions. Thus, similar or even identical reg-
ulatory outcomes imply less by way of ethical agreement
than some may be inclined to believe.
Conclusion
Cloning laws and policies are far from uniform across the
globe and the legal position in some countries remains
uncertain. This will give little comfort to scientists and
policy makers hoping to gain clear direction from the
international position. For the time being at least, policy-
makers must accept the reality of international "dissen-
sus" and scientists wishing to undertaken research on
NRC are best advised to consider conducting their
research in only a handful of countries. Even where there
is agreement as to the regulatory outcome, policy-makers
should not confuse this with agreement on underlying
ethical principles. Like many topics concerning the devel-
oping genetic and reproductive technologies, cloning
remains controversial.
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